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I measure household investment decisions undertaken in a setting that is free from 
investment taxes. The disposition effect is unequivocally present, but any seasonal 
impact of tax-loss selling is absent. There is evidence that the disposition effect 
correlates positively with inferior risk-adjusted investment performance. Although 
household preferences are unknown, losses cannot be explained by tax benefits. 
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1. Introduction 
The disposition effect, disproportionately closing winning positions and holding losing 
ones, is a robust stylized fact concerning individual investor behavior (Barberis & Xiong 
(2009)). Different explanations for this behavior have been offered. These include: prospect 
theory preferences, mental accounting, regret avoidance, lack of self-control, re-balancing 
needs, higher transaction costs at lower prices, liquidity demands, (erroneous) private beliefs 
that indicate holdings are over or under-valued, and a mechanical effect from predominantly 
rising markets.  
With so many competing rationalizations it is unsurprising that disposition effect tests are 
“severely confounded by various possible factors affecting trading” (Ben-David & Hirshleifer 
(2012)). Notable among these factors is tax optimization, where individual investors’ desire 
to minimize their tax liability can lead to byzantine trading strategies. A particular 
combination of tax regime and personal finances could motivate a householder to variously 
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(i) realize losses while they are short-term (ii) take profits only if they are long-term (iii) 
postpone taxable gains by continuing to hold unattractive investments (iii) indulge in tax-
swaps
1
 and/or (iv) offset gains with forced losses, especially towards the end of the fiscal 
year.  
Generally, the disposition bias (sell winners, keep losers) operates in the opposite direction 
of tax optimization (keep winners, sell losers), but this is not necessarily always true. Much 
of the empirical research suggests that (at least, under U.S. tax codes) December is when 
most of the tax-motivated selling occurs although tax considerations may have a year-round 
impact. Relatively little research has considered the disposition effect in the absence of taxes. 
An exception is Dhar & Zhu (2006) who note that taxable and tax-deferred accounts exhibit 
similar disposition outcomes. 
Researchers rarely are able to avoid confounding tax effects because empirical studies have 
typically been in settings with investment taxes. In contrast, the analysis here provides a 
number of interesting results that are obtained free from tax distortions.  
2. Data set 
2.1 Overview  
I analyze investments of individual households using disaggregated daily portfolio data. 
The householders were users of an investment platform which provides online access to over 
400 mutual funds, of a wide range of assets classes and geographies, and whose mixture did 
not change materially over the sample period. Users had 24x7 access to portfolio statements 
and transaction capabilities; trades were executed each business day. The users are 
Singapore-resident for tax purposes. This means they enjoy the benefits of a retail investor-
friendly tax regime: no capital gains tax, no tax on interest nor on dividends. In brief, the 
accounts studied are tax-free. 
The detailed, disaggregated data support household-level and aggregate analyses. I am able 
to compute daily realized and paper gains/losses for each household, as well as observe 
individual trades and their (actual or potential) buy and sell prices. 
 
                                                             
1 Selling a losing instrument and immediately purchasing an instrument with similar risk characteristics, thus maintaining the 
same expected risk-reward profile. 
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2.2 Summary statistics  
The transactional data are from 460,000 trades on mutual funds over the period 2001-2012. 
The data is of audited and reconciled financial records, that is, of exceptional accuracy. Table 
1 shows that the total flow of money associated with these trades is S$4.4 billion (around 
US$3.5 billion at 2013 rates). Table 2 characterizes the associated portfolios of the 4,800 
households. Portfolios with a market value of under $1,000 are excluded from the analysis, to 
help reduce any “play money” bias. 
Table 1 Summary statistics of main trade types 
Monetary values in SGD. Total sample of all individuals. 
Type No. Total flow ($) Mean trades  
per investor 
Mean amount ($)  
per trade 
buy 116,890 921,522,256 14.81 11,552 
sell 55,048 610,252,812 6.98 10,517 
switch-in 145,325 1,329,056,018 18.42 6,201 
switch-out 145,356 1,294,592,567 18.42 5,821 
 
Table 2 Summary statistics of household portfolios 
 Mean Median Min Max S.D. Kurtosis Skewness 
Portfolio ($) 
Size  58,139  19,094   1,000    145,026  166.4 10.3 
Total flow in 79,248 10,000 0  217,314 93.8 7.6 
Total flow out 37,739 1,072 0  104,157 64.2 6.4 
Demographics 
Age 38.9 37.7 19.9 83.0 9.2 0.6 0.8 
Share 
Risky (α) 0.927 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.196 12.3 -3.5 
Equity 0.847 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.277 2.9 -2.0 
Bond 0.120 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.246 5.2 2.4 
Pension 0.575 0.775 0.000 1.000 0.447 -1.7 -0.3 
No. months with a… 
switch 3.70 0.00 0 105 8.90 23.8 4.3 
sell 2.54 1.00 0 72 5.02 30.0 4.4 
buy 8.45 2.00 0 132 17.50 14.3 3.5 
Holding period 
Tenure 51.3 46.0 1 135 37.6 -0.9 0.4 
Start month 57.0 55.0 1 135 33.6 -0.6 0.3 
Last month 107.3 135.0 2 135 37.3 -0.6 -1.0 
Monetary values in SGD. 4,803 households.  Period Oct-2001 (Month 1) to Dec-2012 (Month 135) 
3. Econometric methodology 
The hypothesis tested is that, in aggregate, households tend to sell their winners and hold 
their losers. I compute the proportion of gains realized (PGR) and proportion of losses 
realized (PLR) as per Odean (1998). The null hypothesis is that PGR  PLR. 
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(1) 
The standard error to calculate the t-statistic for the difference in the proportions PGR and 
PLR, also from Odean (1998), is  
    
          
       
 
          
       
 (2) 
where nrg, npg, nrl , and npl are the number of realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, 
and paper losses. 
This is a joint test of the hypothesis of selling outcomes and of the specification of the 
reference point from which gains/losses are determined. For reference point I use the average 
purchase price of the fund; users of the platform are shown a profit and loss figure that 
derives from this same reference point. Hence, it is highly plausible that sell decisions are 
influenced by this particular specification. 
4. Results 
4.1 Aggregate analysis  
Table 3 shows the results of the test of the null hypothesis. The t-statistics range from 24 to 
89 which strongly suggests
2
 that the households under study, in aggregate, have a tendency to 
hold losers and sell winners – even when taxes play no part in their decision making. 
The effect of tax distortions across the fiscal year may be examined by conditioning on 
time. Odean (1998) computes the ratio of PGR to PLR for each month and finds a downward 
slope due to tax-loss selling, as illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 1. As in the U.S. the 
tax year in Singapore is 1 January to 31 December. 
The same ratio is plotted for the householders under study and shown as solid lines in 
Figure 1. Investors in both studies have a mean PGR/PLR of around 1.5, that is, on average, 
retail investors tend to sell 50% more of their winners than they do their losers. 
Although the plots derive from completely different data sets, and we cannot know in 
retrospect what the behavior of Odean’s traders in a zero tax regime might have been, a 
                                                             
2 Odean cautions that the independence assumption will not hold perfectly, and that this could inflate test statistics.  
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number of conclusions may be cautiously drawn. There is no December effect when taxes are 
absent, and moreover, it seems the “tax-free disposition effect” has no obvious seasonality.  
The stylized results I present in chart 1.B  illustrate how the presence of taxes appears to 
lead to a rotation of the line of PGR/PLR ratio: householders sell losers in increasing 
proportions as the year unfolds. 
Table 3 Results of test for disposition effect 
  All  Jan-Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Dec 
PLR 0.110 0.111 0.107 0.102 0.113 0.112 0.113 0.108 0.106 
PGR 0.165 0.166 0.159 0.177 0.175 0.160 0.171 0.158 0.160 
Difference -0.0550 -0.0551 -0.0520 -0.0752 -0.0629 -0.0484 -0.0577 -0.0501 -0.0543 
t-statistic -89.1 -85.7 -24.8 -34.6 -28.6 -23.1 -27.4 -24.1 -24.6 
No. RG 118,159 108,675 9,631 9,617 10,373 9,650 10,371 9,929 9,491 
No. PG 596,984 547,132 50,937 44,705 48,739 50,659 50,258 52,996 49,853 
No. RL 57,740 53,954 4,632 4,550 4,676 5,163 5,485 4,670 3,810 
No. PL 465,847 433,601 38,663 40,115 36,871 41,092 42,879 38,692 32,255 
PGR/PLR 1.50 1.50 1.49 1.74 1.56 1.43 1.51 1.47 1.51 
This table compares the aggregate PGR to the aggregate PLR, as defined in equation (1), and computes t-
statistics from equation (2). Component measures are aggregated over time (2001–2012), and across all 
accounts and households in the sample. Monthly figures were computed for all twelve months but for space 
reasons only a selection is shown. 
 
 
Figure 1 Ratio of PGR to PLR for each month. Aggregated over time (2001-2012) and across all 
accounts. Left chart 1.A shows actual values, right chart 1.B shows stylized results. The dashed line in chart 1.A 
is from Figure 2 in Odean (1998). The setting for the dashed lines is with taxes, and the solid line in a setting 
without taxes. 
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4.2 Disaggregated analysis 
It is of interest to determine whether the observed disposition behavior is rational (under 
standard utility assumptions) or economically beneficial. Thus I examine the link between 
PLR-PGR and risk-adjusted investment performance, measured at the household level. 
Performance is estimated by realized Sharpe ratio and realized Jensen’s alpha, the intercept 
from a multi-factor regression
3
. I sort on PLR-PGR and group into quintiles.  
 
 
Figure 2 The tendency to sell winners is counter-productive. Plots of quintile mean ALPHA and 
SHARPE against the corresponding quintile mean of PLR-PGR, see Table 4. The values of SHARPE are 
normalized to zero for the worst performance. The line fits are illustrative. 
The results are shown in Table 4 and visualized in Figure 2; the greater their disposition 
effect the worse is householders’ investment performance. Although we cannot be sure 
disposition bias is  a cause of under-performance, the correlation is striking. 
                                                             
3 The factors were the MSCI Singapore (S$) MSSINGL~S$ for the equity index and the  Singapore govt bond total return 
(S$) Y07604 for the bond index (both sources Datastream). The Singapore Govt Dealers 3M T-Bill Yield (S$) 
SGSTBILL3M is used for the risk free rate (source: sgs.gov.sg). 
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Table 4 Sort of performance by disposition bias  
 Quintile   
 
LOW Q2 Q3 Q4 HIGH  
HIGH-
LOW 
tstat pvalue 
 
Alpha (%)   0.88 1.08 1.35 1.44 1.87  0.99 2.42 0.016 ** 
Sharpe -6.66 -6.22 -6.04 -6.53 -5.78  0.88 1.60 0.111 
PLR-PGR -0.43 -0.11 -0.02 0.06 0.38     
Investment outcomes as measured by Jensen’s Alpha and by Sharpe ratio, sorted by disposition effect measure. 
Row PLR-PGR is the quintile mean of the individually computed PLR-PGRs for the households in that quintile. 
Sample of 1,679 households. Sharpe ratio x100. Robust t-statistics, **significant at 5%.   
5. Conclusion 
Households in this study show a clear tendency to sell winning funds and hold losers. 
While this result is not new, it is obtained in the absence of investment taxes, which provides 
evidence that tax-optimization is not the sole cause of disposition bias. There is no obvious 
seasonality, such as the December effect, when tax benefits are absent. Additionally, there is 
evidence that disposition bias correlates positively with inferior risk-adjusted investment 
performance. Under standard utility assumptions this behavior appears irrational: investment 
losses are clearly not offset or justified by tax gains, because none exists in this setting. 
Another possibility is that investors have prospect-theory like preferences.  
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